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Dealing with diversity: State strategies on ethnic  
 minority management in Southeast Asia 
 Matthew David D. Ordońez, Hansley A. Juliano, 
 and Enrico Antonio B. La Vińa 
 Abstract—Southeast Asia’s ethnic, political and cultural diversity 
continues to pose major policy and governance hurdles in enforcing a 
common community born out of the post-colonial nationalist baggage 
of almost all the region’s countries. ASEAN’s “non-interference” clause 
gives leeway to each member state to respond to its ethnic diversity 
with nation-building projects through exclusionary governance. With 
this leeway, each Southeast Asian country’s nation-building policies 
legitimize a particular, existing ethno-nationalist or “ethno-religious” 
majority at the expense of democratic accountability. This study 
proposes a preliminary quantitative model which uses regression 
analysis to compare Southeast Asian countries’ data on their religious
and ethnic populations. The initial model categorizes the types 
of minority management strategies depending on their respective 
ethnic heterogeneity. This study hypothesizes that a) states with more 
ethnically homogenous populations will have more exclusionary and 
violent state policies towards minorities, while b) states with more 
heterogeneous populations will have fewer exclusionary and violent 
policies. The results indicate a moderate causality between the two 
variables and may be correlated with additional variables such as 
the level of democratic consolidation (as tabulated by the Polity IV 
democratic index) and the centralized structure of governance. 
Keywords: Southeast Asia, nationalism in Southeast Asia, state-building 
in Asia  
Asian Review 32, (1), 2019, pp.85-108.
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 The challenge of regional diversity  
 
 Studying Southeast Asia as a region remains a constant challenge for 
area scholarship, due to the region’s eclectic characteristics and a seeming 
lack of commonality. However, one observable commonality among 
the countries is their ethnically and culturally diverse populations. As a 
post-colonial region, Southeast Asia consists of young sovereign nation-states 
plunged into a fast-moving, competitive global system. Their perceived 
tardiness towards modernity has pressured the nation-states to “fast 
track” their consolidation of power and resources along trajectories 
undertaken by non-Asian countries, particularly their colonizers.
 This trajectory, while producing some economic “tigers,” is not 
free from problematic elements. Hattori and Funatsu (2003: 145) have 
written how “the latecomer Asian countries’ encounter with Western 
modernity (through not only modern institutions but also new pieces 
of knowledge, new values and blue-prints for what societies should 
be like) had the effect of aggravating or mitigating the conflicts they 
faced.” From this pressure to modernize, these nation-states have 
made ethnicity-based policies at the expense of vulnerable minorities.
 . The region’s most prominent example of ethnically motivated 
state action is the still ongoing Rohingya crisis, where Burma’s Islamic 
Rohingya minority have continued to be driven out of their homes by 
their own country’s military since 2015 (BBC 2018a). As of October 
2015, the number of Rohingya refugees has risen to 700,000—with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) being unable to curb 
this ongoing crisis (Lee 2018). Though the Rohingya crisis is the most 
violent case, Southeast Asia is still home to more varied, sometimes more 
benign, types of state-sponsored ethnic exclusion and discrimination 
(Juliano, La Viña and Ordoñez 2016). For example, in an ethnically 
pluralist country, Indonesia, the Chinese minority is still denied the right 
to land ownership (Yuniar 2018). These instances of ethnic conflict, 
discrimination and violence persist in spite of the many international 
rules and norms in place against such policies. It is even more peculiar 
that the state is the main culprit in such atrocities. This complicates the 
assumed predominance of liberalism even in the electoral democracies 
within the region. While each country differs in its intensity in managing 
ethnic minorities, they seem to follow ethno-nationalist logic as a 
framework to their respective on-going nation-building processes.
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 This study intends to tackle the following research questions from 
the aforementioned puzzle: 1.Why do Southeast Asian countries continue 
to conduct ethnicity-based policies in the context of 21st century ASEAN 
?; and 2.Why do some Southeast Asian countries manage their minorities 
more violently than others?
 For these questions we propose a set of preliminary answers. 
These initial claims are coupled with a proposed quantitative model 
categorizing the types of minority management strategies a state employs 
depending on its respective ethnic heterogeneity. The study operates on 
the following hypotheses: 
All Southeast Asian Nation-states enact policies that favor an 
ethnic majority while persecuting minorities as a means of 
consolidating an ethno-nationalist framework. 
More ethnically homogenous populations (i.e., large ethnic 
majorities) within Southeast Asia would be more predisposed 
to utilize more violent and exclusionary methods for managing 
minorities. 
By contrast, Southeast Asian countries with more ethnically 
pluralistic or heterogeneous societies (i.e., small ethnic majorities) 
may be less inclined to commit violent exclusion. 
 
 The main objective of this study is to quantitatively describe the 
region-wide trend of ethno-nationalist policies in managing ethnic 
minorities and classify each country based on its mode of minority 
management. We articulate our claim in three ways. The first section 
summarizes existing literature on the ethnic dimension of nation-
building in the region and the variety of policies involved. The second 
section presents data on the correlation between a country’s ethnic 
diversity and its mode of minority management. The third section 
presents possible additional variables relevant to the established pattern 
such as democratic consolidation, economic development, the minority 
as threat discourse and the structure of government. 
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The ethnic crisis of modernity in Southeast Asia 
 As Fukuyama (1989) declared in his now clichéd proclamation 
of “the end of history,” Southeast Asia remains one of the areas of the 
globe where illiberal ideologies, non-democratic ideas and nationalisms 
continue to thrive in one form or another. Interestingly, during the 
early years after the Cold War, Southeast Asia became a model region 
in terms of development and state-modernization (Rigg 2004: 3). 
The paradoxical coexistence of illiberal nationalisms and efficient 
state-building is a key phenomenon to understanding the current ethnic 
relations of the state. This section illustrates the consensus within the 
literature on ethno-nationalism and the policies they motivate from 
being tied to the emergence of “modern states” in Southeast Asia. 
However, the literature also provides a wide range of ethnically 
motivated policies and conflicts beyond the extremes of genocide and 
violent displacement. As state capacity varies, so do the kinds of actions 
that the ethno-nationalist state can enact on minorities (Brown 2003: x). 
 Michael Ignatieff (1995: 8) has discussed the political and ideological
conflicts between the ideas of ethnic nationalism (based on biological 
ethnicity) and civic nationalism (based on performative acts of citizenship
and belonging). He specifically points to how ethnic nationalism is “a 
revolt against civic nationalism itself.” This does not necessarily mean 
ethnic nationalism is specifically sustained by authoritarian attitudes and 
politics nor civic nationalism by democratic values. Subsequent research 
by Stilz also suggests that while this conceptual distinction exists, “the 
most developed accounts of civic nationalism currently on offer do not 
adequately disentangle the state from the promotion of the majority 
national culture in practice” (Stilz 2009: 260). This contentious relationship
between exclusivist notions of national identity and the role of the state 
in sustaining them is at the heart of the phenomenon we seek to visualize. 
 As mentioned previously, many of the countries within the region 
gained sovereignty in the late 20th century. Being a post-colonial region, 
much of the modernization and state-building processes were motivated 
by colonial administration and discourse (Reid 2010). Prior to colonial 
intervention, the region was “state-averse” since ethnic groups remained 
geographically decentralized and tribal (Reid 2010: 18). Thus, much 
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of the pre-colonial and colonial ethnic and cultural divides seeped into 
their state-building discourse, evolving into the nationalist agenda 
observable today.
 Regardless of the area, much of the literature considers modernity 
and the modern state to be harbingers of classification and legibility. 
James Scott (1998) articulated the role of the state as an agent of 
the “administrative ordering of nature and society,” controlling both 
the physical environment and human populations. Wimmer (2002) 
strongly argues that ethnic and nationalistic principles are contingent 
to modernity itself and are the “shadow of modernity.” For Reid (2010: 
20), the starting point of Southeast Asian modernity has been “imperial 
alchemy” or the colonial origins of nation-state in the region.
 
Politicized dimensions of ethnic identity 
 Ethnic identity is a complex variable in the social sciences and 
leads to many methodological issues. Many have tried to distinguish 
the objective markers of ethnic identity, namely the biological traits and 
familial lineage, from the subjective markers, namely shared culture, 
history and imagination (Anderson 2006; Chandra 2006; Malesevic 
2006). Such complexity, however, may provide enough flexibility to 
acknowledge the arbitrary invocation of ethnic identity by state power. 
Though the idea of nationalism has evolved throughout the years, ethnic 
identity remains its key ingredient.
 Anderson’s (2006: 46) conception of nations as “imagined 
communities” is one of the most salient ideas on the subject. It complicates
the assumption of nationalism relying on seemingly overt signs of 
national identity. Rather, Anderson’s nationalism comes from shared 
languages and narratives as propagated by creole intellectuals through 
early forms of mass communication. When Chandra (2006) attempted 
to focus on familial lineage as the objective core of ethnic identity, she 
found it had little to no causality with ethnically motivated violence or 
discrimination. By extension, Chandra reveals that much of the power 
in the politicization of ethnic identity lies in the subjective aspects of 
ethnic identity or psychologically and the emotionally charged aspects of 
ethnicity. Malesevic (2006: 227) analyzes ethnic identity as an ideology that 
may motivate both societal inequality and, in extreme cases, mass murder.
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 Though very much intertwined, nationalism and ethnic identity 
are still distinct. It is mainly political actors that conflate the two 
concepts. A common distinction (Stavenhagen 1996; Wolff 2006: 
31) is between ethnic-nationalism, which is based on ethnic identity 
and civic nationalism, which includes immigrants and formalized 
citizens into the nation regardless of biological traits or familial lineage. 
The latter nationalism has been more commonly associated with 
pluralistic liberal democracies. Wolff (2006: 31) further notes that 
ethnic groups seek self-determination but this does not necessarily lead 
to independent statehood in the way nationalism does. In his latest 
work, Wimmer (2018) argues that countries have better political 
integration with linguistic homogeneity, thus motivating policies 
favoring a linguistic majority. However, Stavenhagen (1996: 93-94) 
states the mere existence of shared attributes is not enough to trigger 
conflict that requires specific actors such as “ethnic entrepreneurs” or 
ethnic groups which deploy ethnic ideology.
 In addition to these, the formation of ethnic identities is further 
affected by another significant social force: dominant religious identities. 
The tendency of many Southeast Asian countries to ethno-religious 
identification has been noted in the literature. Searle (2002: 1) suggested 
that this is usually “spurred by the conjunction of economic and social 
marginalization with significant demographic change,” while other
research claims that this is neither as clear-cut nor deterministic as 
implied (with Frith [2000] implying this is also a matter of exposure to
relative and reflexive modern conditions), so the reality of ethno-religious 
identities serving as a mobilizing ideological platform should not be 
ignored. It is due to these that we employ these three demographic 
markers (ethnicity, religious identity and national identity) in our model 
visualization below.
 
 Methods of ethnic management 
 Besides the subjective and ideological motivations for ethno-
nationalism, there are also material conditions that necessitate the 
management of ethnic diversity. There are two main motivations in 
nation-state building. First is maintaining political legitimacy among 
the populace (Horowitz 1993; Wimmer 1997, 2018; Brown 2003), in 
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order to preserve its authority, presence and unencumbered freedom 
of action. Second is the consolidation of limited economic resources 
(Chua 1995, 2004; Wimmer 1997), for the purpose of accomplishing 
the first motivation. The capacity of each Southeast Asian nation-state 
varies as much as its ethnic demographics. As argued by Pierre Bourdieu 
(1994: 15), only by maintaining unquestioned or “doxic submission to 
the established order” can the nation-state maintain legitimacy and its 
attendant powers. This, understandably, is more easily accomplished 
with a relatively-homogenous population. Due to these realities, there 
are various types of strategy that states employ to manage the ethnic 
plurality of their respective populations.
 Horowitz (1993: 20-21) acknowledges that ethnic identity and 
its conflicts act as obstacles to even the most democratic countries 
in the Southeast Asian region. Patterns in ethnic inequality produce 
changes in inclusion and exclusion from political participatory practices. 
Wimmer (1997; 2002) argues that ethnic identity is closely linked to 
state legitimacy particularly in post-colonial states. By the end of the 
Cold War, many ethnic divides emerged in many countries before civil 
society took root and turned politics into “an arena of ethno-nationalist 
competition” (Wimmer 2002: 113). His data found that once an eth-
nic faction declared independence, many other ethnic minorities also 
contested independence and claimed autonomy (Wimmer 2002: 88). 
In a much later work, Wimmer (2013), appropriates Charles Tilly’s 
dictum of “war-making as state-making” when he observes states using 
violence against ethnic masses and in favor of a dominant elite.
 Despite this resonance in the literature regarding ethnic violence 
not all ethno-nationalist policies lead to violence. Stavenhagen (1996: 
192-202) makes among the earliest classifications of ethnic policies 
across multiple regions where ethnic conflicts are present. He classifies 
them into three types: assimilation, where a dominant “nationhood” 
is imposed on the polity to incorporate immigrants and minorities; 
exclusion, which ranges from physical violence to institutional 
discrimination; and pluralism, which permits the multiplicity of ethnic 
and cultural identities. Despite the frequency of assimilationist and 
exclusionary policies, Stavenhagen (1996: 202) finds pluralism to be 
the most common policy. Pluralist policies range from a laissez-faire 
mode, which does not recognize ethnic identity, to a mode that explicitly
recognizes these differences and allows for judicious negotiations. 
Dealing with diversity
92 
Such policy schemes, despite their commonality and benefits, can have 
expected mixed effects. While they may guarantee a level of concord 
and possibly foster positive multicultural contact, perceived inequalities 
in treatment may become touchstones of public dissent and debate.
 Chua (1997) expounds on the more explicitly economic policies 
and documents the cycle of privatization and nationalization of property
in Southeast Asia and Latin America. Once these regions became 
independent, ethnic minorities began privatizing land and patrimonial 
resources, leading the government to “re-nationalize” these resources 
from them. Chua (2004: 17) attributes this trend to the spread of 
liberal democracy which exacerbated inequality with the rise of market 
dominant minorities. Here, state policies seem to correct these economic 
inequalities on ethnic lines particularly against Chinese businesses in 
Burma and Indonesia. 
 David Brown’s The State and Ethnic Politics and Southeast Asia (2003) 
is a foundational foray into a region-wide study of ethnic politics in 
Southeast-Asia. Rather than strict typologies based on variables, Brown 
uses five specific case countries to highlight particular ethnic dynamics:
 
a. Burma exhibits an ethnocratic state where the central 
government violently crushes ethnic rebellions (23-45). 
b. Singapore has an ethnic corporatist regime that organizes 
the concerns of different ethnic groups (47-76). 
c. Thailand has an ethno-regional model which favors a core 
region with economic development policies (109-142). 
d. Indonesians have a neo-patrimonial regime which 
normally deploys ethnic-identity during elections via 
patron-client relations (77-108). 
e. Finally, Malaysians exhibit class conflict between the Chinese 
economic elite and the local Malays (142-179).
 
 In summary, while much of the literature cites Southeast Asian 
countries as cases on ethnic politics (Horowitz 1993; Chua 1995, 
2004; Stavenhagen 1996), there are hardly any other works like David 
Brown’s (2003) key work that focus on the entire region. Furthermore, 
though there are clearly distinct strategies, there are not many studies 
explaining under what conditions would a state favor an assimilationist, 
exclusionary or pluralist strategy. Such a question may help predict 
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certain actions of countries under certain conditions. There have been 
many significant political changes since its publication (e.g., the Rohingya 
crisis in Burma). Hence, this work seeks to further integrate the region’s 
case with larger theories to either confirm or update certain assumptions 
on ethnic politics in Southeast Asia.
 
Reading the region: An ethnic profile of Southeast Asia 
 
 This section provides a general profile of the post-colonial development 
and ethnic majorities within the region. The ethnic profile identifies 
the ethnic majorities and measures their proportion with the country’s 
population while identifying the religious majority. From here, the coded 
ethnic majority values are measured against religious majority values to 
derive a variable that we call religious-ethnicity (R-E) quotient. The data 
on ethnic composition was sourced from the most recent edition of the 
CIA Factbook available online as of 2018. While this may not be the most 
exhaustively accurate picture of the region’s ethnic composition, it is detailed 
enough for the overview purposes of this study. Subsequently, we correlate 
the R-E quotient with data from the Center for Systemic Peace’s Polity IV 
Project on government regime type. These values are possible intervening 
variables that may affect the type of ethnic minority management each 
country employs. Finally, this section gives an overview of state actions 
against minorities throughout the countries in the region.
 The qualitative nature of the field and the historicizing tendency of 
the literature on Southeast Asian politics can give the impression that each 
country’s ethnic minority issues are primarily internal/domestic affairs. It 
is easy to presume that inquiries on ethnic politics require a clear sense 
of the distinct cultural and historical developments experienced by each 
country. This presumption, however, belies the historical record. While each 
Southeast Asian nation’s case and history may indeed be characterized as 
unique, nearly all of them, with the exception of uncolonized Thailand, 
had undergone decolonization by the tail-end of the Second World War. 
At the same time, the vulnerabilities of newly-decolonized states (and the 
state-building demands each country faced) in the context of the Cold War 
(1947-1991) definitely contributed to their choices of governance (Goscha 
and Ostermann 2009)—with a significant impact on their populations, 
especially their minorities. 
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{insert Figure 1 here} 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of decolonization in Southeast Asia 
 
 When taking into account the treatment of ethnic minorities it 
is very important to take into consideration the nature and makeup 
of the majority population. In this, Southeast Asian nations still have 
significant differences. However, as is shown in Table 1, there is a clearly 
visible commonality. 
  
Table 1. Religious and ethnic majority demographics of Southeast-Asian 
nations (CIA 2016)  
Country Religious  Percentage Ethnic Percentage  Majority  Majority 
Brunei Muslim 78.8 Malay 65.7
Cambodia Buddhist 96.9 Khmer 90
Indonesia Muslim 87.2 Javanese 40.1
Laos Buddhist 66.8 Lao 54.6
Malaysia Muslim 61.3 Malay 50.1
Myanmar Buddhist 89 Burmese 68
Philippines Christian 92.5 Tagalog 28.1
Singapore Buddhist 33.8 Chinese 74.2
Thailand Buddhist 93.6 Thai 95.9
Timor-Leste Christian 97.6 Austronesian  30.6    (Tetun) 
Vietnam None 80.8 Viet 85.7
 
 It can be demonstrated that most Southeast Asian countries 
(save for Singapore, Indonesia, Timor-Leste and the Philippines) range to
a near-1:1 correspondence between their ethnic majority and their 
religious majority populations. This is codified using an R-E (religion-ethnicity)
quotient, wherein 
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 R-E Quotient  = (R.M. Percentage)
   (E.M. Percentage) 
 
 The relationship between such variables is illustrated below in Figure 2. 
 
 
 Figure 2. Religion and ethnicity correspondence in Southeast Asian 
populations 
 
 Understandably, there is no demonstrable model suggesting that 
membership in a dominant ethnic group guarantees membership of 
a religious majority as well. However, a correspondence between the 
religious and ethnic identity of a population may provide certain points 
of consideration. The codification of a common ethnicity and religion 
into a national narrative is still integral to the state’s capacity to governance
and maintaining social cohesion 
 Such factors can have considerable effects on the kind of institutional
evolution a government may take. This can be illustrated by data 
from the Polity IV Project, an “annual, cross-national, time-series 
and polity-case format coding democratic and autocratic ‘patterns of 
authority’ and regime changes in all independent countries with total 
populations greater than 500,000.” The project “captures this regime 
authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from “-10 (hereditary 
monarchy)” to “+10 (consolidated democracy).” The Polity scores can 
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also be converted into regime categories in a three part categorization of 
“autocracies” (-10 to -6), “anocracies” (-5 to +5 and three special values: 
-66, -77 and -88), and “democracies” (+6 to +10).” (Center for Systemic 
Peace 2018; emphasis is ours.) 
 The 2017 dataset of Polity IV data classifies countries in the region
into three categories. Brunei, Vietnam and Laos are deemed to be autocratic,
while Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore are classified 
consistently as anocratic regimes. Finally, the Philippines, Indonesia and 
Timor-Leste continue to score along the democratic spectrum. Myanmar 
is an outlier after recently being classified as democratic after years of 
being considered autocratic (1962-2009), and anocratic (2010-2015). 
This change in classification is understandable, considering the longevity 
of the military junta and the only-recent ascension of Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
National League for Democracy to government in 2016 (BBC 2018b). 
 
 
Figure 3. 2017 Polity IV scores for Southeast Asian countries 
 
 To test the quantitative basis for the relationship between population
demographic and form of government, we subjected the country cases’ 
R-E quotient and Polity IV scores to regression analysis. Below are the 
results. 
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Table 2 and 3. Regression Analysis Results. 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.669404135
R Square 0.448101896
Adjusted R Square 0.386779884
Standard Error 0.727316728
Observations 11
 
   Intercept X Variable 1
Coefficients 1.512017867 0.085993612
Standard Error 0.219770454 0.031811635
t Stat 6.879986999 2.703212546
P-value 7.23E-05 0.024265699
Lower 95% 1.01486256 0.014030693
Upper 95% 2.009173174 0.157956531
Lower 95.0% 1.01486256 0.014030693
 
 The regression analysis returned a Multiple R value of 0.669~ 
or around 66.9%. Furthermore, the residuals returned an x variable 
coefficient of positive 0.085993612. Both these results suggest 
a moderate positive correlation between a country with a visible 
ethno-religious majority and that country having autocratic or 
anocratic regimes. In brief, it suggests that if a Southeast Asian country’s
population is near-homogenous, there will be significant basis for a 
government to primarily appeal to the majority even at the expense of 
excluding their resident minorities. 
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Figure 4. Regression analysis scatterplot of data. 
 
 Logically, countries with solid majorities, particularly countries with 
insecure borders and emerging political cultures, have larger bases for 
governments which tend to centralize power—at the expense of wider 
representation and devolved powers at the local level. Nevertheless, it 
would be wrong to assume that these developments are set in stone. 
 The historical events experienced by Southeast Asian nations 
for most of the 20th century, as we will detail below, suggest such
developments have tended to be triggered by particular historical 
flashpoints and crises. In the case of Southeast Asia, most of these events 
occurred during the context of the Cold War and the early years of 
regional decolonization. At the same time, there are also long-standing 
enmities between ethnic groups which can be traced to historical, 
pre-modern conflicts even prior to colonization—and some of these 
conflicts have been elevated the moment one particular ethnic group 
became the dominant population in a Southeast Asian country 
immediately after decolonization and partition. 
 We managed to document, via archival analysis as well as recent local 
and international news coverage, the history of minority populations
within nine Southeast Asian countries. The most relevant facts for each 
country have been listed in Table 4. 
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 When a nation-building ideology develops towards an homogenous 
narrative, it is likely to gloss over the actual ethnic composition of a 
society. Anderson (2006: 110) acknowledged this when he pointed 
to how “[i]n almost every case, official nationalism concealed a discrepancy
between nation and dynastic realm.” This poses significant risks to 
ethnic minorities, whose perceived non-compliance to the dominant 
identity renders them vulnerable to varying levels of management. 
As shown in Table 4, it is the countries that a) have had long histories 
of autocratic and anocratic governments with b) a significant level of 
population homogeneity (Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Malaysia, Vietnam
and Cambodia) that have been known to engage in violent and 
exclusionary policies against its minorities. 
 
 
  
 
Table 4. Summarized data on documented actions towards minorities 
in Southeast Asia1 
Country Case
Thailand
Myanmar
Laos
Malaysia
Minority
Pattani, Yala 
and Narathiwat 
Muslims
Rakhine / Rohingya 
Muslims
Highland/
lowland 
minorities & 
Hmong
Malay-Chinese
Historic Conflict 
Point(s)
1909 Anglo-Siamese 
Treaty
The Pattani 
Insurgency
1948 Post-
Independence 
Conflicts in 
Arakan
The Rohingya 
Crisis
The Secret War
1964 “race riots”
Singapore’s 
secession
Modes of Treatment
Illegal execution & 
torture
Other human Rights 
abuses
Dispersal/deportation
Abetting human 
trafficking
“Mass graves” & denial 
of asylum
Burning of mosques
Highlanders: forced 
relocation / reeducation
Hmong: killings and 
persecution
Bumiputera / NEP 
policies
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Table 4. Summarized data on documented actions towards minorities 
in Southeast Asia1 
Source: Juliano, La Viña and Ordoñez 2016; 2017.
Country Case
Vietnam
Cambodia
 
Indonesia
Philippines
Singapore
Minority
Hmong, Dega-
Montagnards, 
Khmer-Krom
Viet
“Nonprotected” 
religious 
minorities
“Moro”
Malays, Indonesians, 
“others”.
Immigrant “workers” & 
“talents”
Historic Conflict 
Point(s)
The Vietnam War
The “Killing 
Fields” & Ethnic 
Cleansing
1965 Blasphemy 
Law
Decrees on Houses of  
Worship
2008 Anti-Ahmadiyah 
Decree
American-era 
discrimination
Martial Law 
(1972-1981) & 
the Separatist 
Movement
Global Terrorism
2015 Mamasapano 
Clash
2017 Marawi 
Siege
1982 Mendaki
“CMIO” vs. 
immigrants
Modes of Treatment
Hmong: economic / 
social services neglect
Dega & Krom: 
cultural & religious 
persecution
Denial of citizenship
Human trafficking
Non-approval/
destruction of houses 
of  worship;
Blasphemy/conversion 
prosecutions
Non-prevention  of 
minority mob killings
Mismanagement of 
ARMM
Arroyo-era support of 
local strongmen
Island-wide “martial law” 
(2009 & 2017)
Uncertainties of the 
BBL Process (under 
Aquino and Duterte)
MIO’s: unequal 
economic opportunities
Immigrants: unequal 
“employment pass” access
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 By contrast, modern-day Indonesia and the Philippines are coun-
tries with a significant disconnect between their ethnic and religious 
majorities, as well as a relatively-higher level of democratization in the 
region. While it does not guarantee that minorities in such countries 
are protected from violent forms of discrimination, such policies tend 
to be unsanctioned by their government, therefore demonstrating short-
comings in governance rather than embedded institutional prejudices 
against minorities.
Singapore is another outlier as a country with an anocratic government 
but one that conducts assimilationist policies vis-à-vis its minority 
populations (albeit employed inconsistently). This may be explained 
by Singapore’s structure as a cosmopolitan space—despite its limited 
land mass for its growing population. This contradiction provides an 
opportunity for partitioning policies between its “prioritized residents” 
and its migrants, who are treated as potentially destabilizing elements 
(Juliano, Ordoñez and La Viña, 2016: 98). 
Analysis: Towards a new typology? 
 This section presents a typology-based ethnic profile of the coun-
tries in the region. We subsequently compare each country via the 
type of ethnic policies deployed by their respective states. In testing 
our hypothesis, this study uses the level of ethnic homogeneity or the 
proportion of the ethnic majority to the population as the independent 
variable. From there, the countries are classified in the compass from a 
continuum between pluralist states or countries that permit multi-ethnic 
countries, and exclusionary states or countries that perform more overt 
policies of violence and discrimination against ethnic minorities. The 
typology assumes that while all the countries have an ethno-nationalist 
agenda, their respective state’s capacities in relation to their respective 
ethnic and demographic profiles are necessarily limited to committing 
outright genocide or the exclusion of multiple minority groups. Thus, 
more homogenous societies may be more inclined to overt exclusion 
while heterogeneous societies remain pluralist or perform less violent 
exclusion. 
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Figure 5. Compass of ethnic minority management based on ethnic 
heterogeneity 
 
 The data shows the negative relationship between the level of ethnic 
heterogeneity and the level of state violence against ethnic minorities. 
The relationship between the two variables can be divided into four 
quadrants. In the upper-left quadrant are countries that have both a 
high level of ethnic heterogeneity and a relatively exclusionary state, 
while in the lower-right quadrant are cases of states with low levels 
of ethnic heterogeneity and a relatively pluralist state. The absence of 
Southeast Asian countries in either quadrant supports our hypothesis 
that more homogenous populations are more likely to have exclusionary 
and violent state policies towards minorities, while less homogenous 
populations have fewer exclusionary and violent policies.
 In the upper-right quadrant are countries that have high levels 
of ethnic heterogeneity and a relatively pluralist state. The lower-left 
quadrant shows countries that have lower levels of ethnic heterogeneity 
and a relatively exclusionary state. Thus, Southeast Asian countries 
either have low heterogeneity and a force-based governance strategy 
towards minorities (Laos, Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Malaysia) or have high heterogeneity and less violent governance 
strategy towards minorities (Singapore and the Philippines). Indonesia 
is the exception in the region as it cannot be neatly categorized as a 
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high-heterogeneity/pluralist or low-heterogeneity/exclusionary state. 
Still, an examination of Indonesia’s governance of ethnic minorities 
supports its classification as a pluralist state. An analysis of each country’s 
regime type explains its respective minority-governance strategies.
      Southeast Asia “presents a perplexing political patchwork” since 
the region is home to electoral democracies, authoritarian regimes and 
regimes that have both the competitive and authoritarian characteristics 
of varying state capacities (Slater 2010: 7). Hence, there are regime 
distinctions even within the exclusionary state and exclusionary state 
categories. In the case of the exclusionary states, Thailand, Myanmar and 
Malaysia are all countries with centralized authorities, while Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia are communist-led states. Communist-led states 
in Southeast Asia, on the other hand, are characterized by “closed 
and nominally communist political systems with open and mostly 
competitive market economies” (Reilly 2013). As for pluralist states, 
the Philippines and Indonesia are both considered to be personalistic 
regimes, which are defined as states “where factional dynamics revolve 
almost exclusively around access to patronage resources distributed 
by the dominant leader” (Fionna and Tomsa 2017). According to 
Winters (2011: 135), these personalistic regimes are dominated by 
oligarchs whose near-monopoly of legal institutions is complemented 
by the “vicissitudes that accompany personalistic rule.” Singapore, in 
contrast, is characterized by Levitsky and Way (2002: 53) as an electoral 
authoritarian regime due to “the uneven playing field between 
government and opposition.”
 An examination of Southeast Asian regime types indicates a relation-
ship between the degree of authoritarianism and whether they can be 
characterized as exclusionary states. Countries like Thailand, Malaysia, 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are more likely to employ exclusionary 
management mechanisms. Myanmar, while classified as democratic by 
Polity, is still dominated by the military which led the expulsion and 
massacre of the Rohingya (Wong 2018). Pluralist states, on the other 
hand, are relatively more democratic, as demonstrated in the cases of 
the Philippines and Indonesia, which have been less intrusive in the 
affairs of minorities. The exception is Singapore, which has a Polity 
score lower than Malaysia and Myanmar. Singapore, in contrast to the 
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Philippines and Indonesia, “developed institutions and systems that 
would allow it to control, manage and harness its residents’ diversity 
towards state-defined interests” (Juliano, Ordoñez, and La Viña 2016: 
75). Hence, while exclusionary policies in Singapore are rarely explicit 
or violent, they are nonetheless enforced with a severity and consistency 
while affected groups can hardly contest them in a systemic, political 
process-oriented manner. 
Conclusion 
 
 This study has presented data showing a moderate correlation 
between ethnic homogeneity and the types of ethnic minority management 
a state employs. The region, indeed, currently experiences ethno-
nationalist policies, albeit with constraints. Though our model admittedly
paints many broad strokes across the countries in the region, these results 
justify further elaboration on the particularities of each country and the 
general type of management. There are also further opportunities to 
test other intervening variables such as the level of democratization and 
economic development. Democratic and authoritarian countries 
necessarily have different norms regarding minorities and will definitely 
complicate the model. Another variable worth testing is religion, another 
ingredient of nationalism which remains relevant for certain countries 
such as Thailand and Malaysia but may not be as significant in others. 
This study presumes ethnic minorities to be politically-neutral elements 
and would benefit from distinctions between minorities actively engaging 
in forceful or violent resistance, as well as those who have chosen 
non-violent engagement. Overall, despite the preliminary nature of its 
findings, this study is an important initial step in understanding the logic 
behind the current ethnic minority crises throughout Southeast Asia. 
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